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ABSTRACT ■ This article analyses the impact of the European Works
Councils (EWCs) Directive in Portuguese multinationals. Though seven
Portuguese companies are covered by the provisions of the Directive, only
one EWC exists. Some of the main obstacles to the establishment of EWCs
in Portugal are identified. The experience of the Banco Espírito Santo Group,
where the only Portuguese EWC currently exists, is discussed.
KEYWORDS: European Works Councils ■ Portugal ■ trade unions
Introduction
In September 1994, the Council of Ministers adopted the European
Works Council (EWC) Directive. The Directive was enthusiastically
welcomed by European trade unions, especially because it was the first
EU Directive which prescribed employees’ right to information and con-
sultation, an issue over which unions had been campaigning for a quar-
ter of a century. Theoretically, EWCs have both a regulatory and an
emancipatory dimension. They are, on the one hand, the result of a top-
down process of Community regulation (Miller, 1999), aiming to create
a transnational information system that is adequate to the transnational
structure of Community-scale companies or groups of companies. On
the other hand, behind the establishment of the EWCs lies also the
prospect of bottom-up action founded on the possibility (or aspiration)
that they will become genuine European institutions acting as collective
actors – where common interests are aggregated at supranational level
and EWCs have managed to develop a common identity – instead of act-
ing in a parochial and fragmentary way (Knudsen, 2003). This issue is all
the more pertinent as we know that EWCs are not naturally solidaristic
organizations (Stirling and Tully, 2004) and that the development of a
European labour identity remains a challenge for the vast majority of
EWCs (Whittall et al., 2007).
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The aim of this article is to focus on the impact of the Directive in
multinational companies (MNCs) based in Portugal. Of the seven com-
panies which meet the specified employment thresholds (at least 1000
employees in the EU, including 150 or more in at least two countries),
only one has established an EWC (which is mandatory only if ‘triggered’
by employee representatives). We report the opinions of trade union rep-
resentatives and members of workers’ commissions (comissões de trabal-
hadores), which indicate that their sceptical view of the benefits of the
new institution is one of the main factors that have so far limited the
establishment of EWCs. But to counterbalance this rather negative per-
spective we examine the experience of the sole EWC so far established
within a Portuguese MNC, at the Banco Espírito Santo (BES) Group. We
also consider the opinions of Portuguese representatives on EWCs in
foreign MNCs. This will allow us to highlight some signs of greater, even
if cautious, optimism which provides a contrast with the greater pes-
simism of the workers’ representatives in Portuguese MNCs.
The Directive can be viewed as a compensation for the deficit in
employee representation and participation at European level and within
MNCs. EWCs might be though in principle particularly valuable for
employee representatives in semi-peripheral countries such as Portugal,
since the locus of decision-making on corporate policy may be geograph-
ically distant. Thus in theory, EWCs might constitute important struc-
tures complementing existing national institutional arrangements. This
‘functionalist optimism’ (Hancké, 2000: 37) figures to some extent in the
comments of Portuguese representatives who have participated in EWCs.
However, as noted above, employee representatives in Portuguese MNCs
where EWCs have not been set up appear more sceptical as to the poten-
tial benefits. As will be explained below, this defensive attitude depends,
among other factors, on the policies adopted by the major Portuguese
trade union confederations. These tend to be inspired by short-term
national and local goals, which in turn limits the construction of genuine
labour internationalism (Costa, 2005). Additionally, the right to informa-
tion and consultation provided by EU legislation is not regarded as an
added-value, insofar as it is already laid down in the sections of the
Portuguese Constitution (Articles 54 and 55) which regulate both work-
ers’ commissions and trade union delegates (delegados sindicais).
EWCs in Portugal
In Portugal, there is a deficit of information on the role and objectives of
EWCs. Almost ten years after the Directive was transposed into domestic
law (June 1999), Portugal appears to be still going through a learning
process. There are few training opportunities for EWC members and little
attempt to share their experiences in a trade union context. The significance
of EWCs tends to be discounted, both within the main structures of work-
ers’ representation (trade unions and workers’ commissions) and among
academics themselves. The lack of information on EWCs extends to the
main government agencies: the Portuguese National Institute for Statistics
(Instituto Nacional de Estatística) and the Ministry of Labour and
Solidarity (Ministério do Trabalho e da Solidariedade Social). To some
extent this reflects a more general void to be filled on the role of southern
Europe in the development of EWCs.
Systematic research into EWCs in Portugal is therefore urgently
required. This article presents some results from a research project that
was recently concluded at the Centro de Estudos Sociais of the
Universidade de Coimbra.1 The aim is to provide a detailed analysis of
the situation, giving special attention to four main topics of research:
first, the state of play regarding the establishment of EWCs in Portugal;
second, an analysis of the agreements establishing EWCs in which
Portuguese representatives participate; third, the experiences of
Portuguese employee representatives in EWCs; and fourth, management
views of EWCs.
The first theme was addressed through systematic analysis of the
European Works Councils Databases (Kerckhofs and Pas, 2004, 2006);
these enabled us to draw a quantitative picture of the application of the
Directive in multinationals with both their head office and operations in
Portugal. Underlying the development of the second research theme – the
study of the content of agreements – was the assumption that the negotia-
tion of these agreements constitutes an important moment in the life of an
EWC. On the one hand, the terms of the agreement may limit its func-
tioning in the future; on the other, the negotiating process may immedi-
ately bring to light the power relationships which come into play once the
EWC is established. However, we share the view held by some authors that
the letter of the agreements and the dynamics of EWCs once established do
not necessarily coincide (Telljohann, 2005; Waddington, 2003).
The third theme – the evaluation of the experiences of Portuguese rep-
resentatives on EWCs, as well as the attitudes of workers’ representatives
in Portuguese MNCs which did not set up an EWC – was addressed
through a series of semi-structured interviews. Finally, the fourth
research issue – management views on EWCs – was studied by means of
a survey. Managements in companies with Portuguese representatives in
EWCs were asked their views on the following topics: the process of
establishing the EWC; the participation of the management representa-
tives in its activities; their assessment of the role and impact of the EWC;
and the main advantages and limitations of the institution.
Costa & Araújo:  European Companies without European Works Councils 
311
MNCs Operating in Portugal and Portuguese 
EWC Representatives
According to the European Works Councils Database (Kerckhofs and
Pas, 2006), there are 2204 companies covered by the Directive, of which
615 have operations in Portugal. The headquarters of these 615 MNCs
are geographically concentrated: 110 are in the USA, 105 in Germany, 91
in France and 78 in the United Kingdom.
Just over half (335) of the 615 companies have established EWCs.2 In
terms of location of headquarters the distribution is roughly proportional
to the number of firms covered by the Directive: the USA (63), Germany
(54), France (53) and the UK (44) are the main home countries. Of the new
Member States that joined the EU in 2004 and 2007, only Malta and Poland
have MNCs with operations in Portugal and only the Polish company is
covered by the Directive, although it has not established any information
and consultation mechanism. In sectoral terms, the 335 EWCs are based
primarily in metal-working (34.3%) and chemicals (23%). Most of the
remainder are based in the hotel and catering industries (10.4%), finance
(8.1%), building and woodworking (6%) and miscellaneous services
(5.4%).
Finally, the number of Portuguese representatives elected or appointed
to EWCs provides a clearer picture of Portuguese involvement. These
representatives were identified from the EWC agreements in the 2004 and
2006 European Works Councils Databases (Kerckhofs and Pas, 2004,
2006). Companies where Portuguese representatives are not mentioned in
either the databases or the agreements have been excluded from this study.
Where the agreements have been revised or reformulated, the number of
representatives considered was that of the most recent agreement. Given
these criteria, we identified 201 representatives in 163 EWCs.
As Table 1 shows, the main home countries of MNCs with Portuguese
representatives are the USA (42), France (39), Germany and the UK (27
each). In sectoral terms, they are found primarily in metal-working (63
representatives in 55 EWCs), chemicals (37 representatives in 36 EWCs),
financial services (30 representatives in 16 EWCs); hotels and catering (27
representatives in 20 EWCs) and textiles (13 representatives in six EWCs).
Obstacles to the Establishment of EWCs 
in Portuguese MNCs
As noted above, there are seven Portuguese-owned MNCs which meet
the employment threshold of the Directive.3 Of these, only the BES
Group has established, in 2003, an Information and Consultation
Procedure which was converted into an EWC in 2005. The other six
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MNCs are Caixa Geral de Depósitos and Millennium BCP (finance),
Corticeira Amorim (which manufactures cork-based products), Sonae
Indústria (wood-based products), the cement manufacturer Cimentos de
Portugal-CIMPOR and Galp Energia-Petrogal (petrochemicals).
To explore why no initiative had been taken to establish an EWC in
these companies, we conducted interviews between September and
December 2006 with members of workers’ commissions and trade union
representatives. Their responses allowed us to identify several factors
inhibiting the constitution of EWCs. It is important to note that each of
the factors identified applies to more than one company but not neces-
sarily to all of them. According to our analysis, it is distinctive combina-
tions of these factors that obstruct the creation of EWCs in Portuguese
MNCs.
As indicated previously, most workers’ representatives in Portuguese
MNCs see little need to establish an EWC. This is partly a result of the
fact that the Portuguese trade union confederations (to which those rep-
resentatives are directly or indirectly connected) fail to assign much pri-
ority to EWCs. There are two main confederations, the Confederação
Geral dos Trabalhadores Portugueses (General Confederation of
Portuguese Workers, CGTP) and the União Geral de Trabalhadores
(General Workers’ Union, UGT), and these have conflicting opinions
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TABLE 1. Portuguese EWC Representatives, by Country of Ownership
N %
Austria 1 –
Belgium 4 2
Denmark 5 2
Finland 3 1
France 39 19
Germany 27 13
EU-15 Holland 7 3
Italy 7 3
Portugal 10 5
Spain 4 2
Sweden 5 2
UK 27 13
EFTA Switzerland 14 7
Australia 1 –
Japan 3 1
Non-EEA South Korea 1 –
Singapore 1 –
USA 42 21
Source: Kerckhofs and Pas (2006).
on EWCs. The CGTP – which was historically anti-EU – has always
taken the view that EWCs are accorded too much significance in the
European trade union movement, in the light of their limited powers and
functions. The position of the UGT is more positive, perhaps because of
its stronger tradition of inclusion in transnational trade unions organiza-
tions. It affiliated to the International Confederation of Free Trade
Unions (ICFTU) in 1979, and to the European Trade Union
Confederation (ETUC) in 1983. Because of its communist background,
the CGTP was admitted to the ETUC only in 1994 and is not yet affili-
ated at international level.
The CGTP gives primary attention to its penetration and represen-
tativeness within companies (not only MNCs but also in small- and 
medium-sized enterprises, which account for around 90 percent of
Portuguese employment). It is concerned above all with developing
directly representative structures: delegados sindicais (which represent
the trade union members in the company) and comissões de trabalhadores
(which represent the entire workforce). In general, the number of worker
representatives who identify with or are affiliated to CGTP structures is
considerably higher than for the UGT. However, banking is one of the
few sectors where the UGT is predominant, and the BES Group EWC
was initiated by a majority of UGT-affiliated unionists.
We distinguish two main sets of obstacles to the formation of EWCs:
one associated with the social and economic background; the second,
more related to the features of the Portuguese industrial relations system.
Social and Economic Background
National Priorities Take Precedence Over the Establishment of 
EWCs. According to the interviewees, this is the major obstacle to the
constitution of EWCs. Faced with many problems at local and national
levels, the establishment of EWCs is relegated to second place. The defence
of employees at workplace level is the priority, and this priority is rein-
forced by the fact that the elected bodies are the direct representatives of
their own workers and are obliged to respond to their wishes.
If supranational pressures on Portuguese multinationals might suggest
the need for EWCs to coordinate cross-national responses, the reverse is
in fact the case. Defending ‘their’ employees’ interests becomes more
aggressive at local level. As Weston and Martínez Lucio (1997: 766)
highlight, fostering competition between locations has become integral
to management strategy:
the constant cross-referencing . . . by management within companies, on
matters related to production and human resource management, is inspired
by the notion that employees will feel that disinvestment is a likely prospect
should they not react to the ‘higher’ levels of activity in foreign plants.
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This is more likely to hinder than amplify unity and solidarity.
The possibility of EWCs acting as collective actors, instead of acting
in a fragmented way, depends on a diversity of conditions and circum-
stances (Knudsen, 2003). In some cases, EWCs have developed a common
identity by aggregating different interests at supranational level; in many
others, conflicting national interests override international solidarity
(Hancké, 2000). In our interviews with the representatives of Portuguese
employees, it was clear that economic imperatives and inter-plant com-
petition are obstacles to the development of unity and solidarity. What
participation in EWCs has made obvious to Portuguese representatives is
that the global mobility of MNCs represents, in extreme form, the volatil-
ity of local jobs. Despite the expectations generated by EWCs and their
possible success when in operation, it is a fact that when insecurity shapes
the background it becomes more difficult to meet the challenge of unity
and solidarity, in so far as the defence of local interests and employees
gains in aggressiveness.
The Privatization Processes. The privatization processes affecting pub-
lic and semi-public companies, in addition to the other problems they
entail, contribute to a decrease in the ‘participation culture’ within the
company. The admission of new employees to the companies, under new
contractual conditions, constitutes in this context a considerable obstacle
to participation. In our research we noticed that all the Portuguese rep-
resentatives in EWCs have permanent employment contracts. It seems
plausible to infer that the predisposition to participate in EWCs, as with
participation in other structures of worker representation, varies directly
in accordance with the stability and security afforded by the employment
relationship. As a member of the comissão de trabalhadores at CIMPOR
commented:
The various phases of privatization led to successive job reductions and
alterations in the organization of work . . . It would be very good for us
to have young employees participating, but the young employees who
join CIMPOR are fixed-term employees and, therefore, don’t get
involved . . . Other young people who join the company have university
degrees and hold posts of responsibility; they’re given objectives to fulfil,
and, at this level, there’s some prejudice against being a member of a
trade union. The privatization of the company did nothing to improve
workers’ participation. EWCs also suffer from this situation.
Conflicts between Employers and Worker Representation Bodies and Trade
Unions. As is generally recognized by the Portuguese trade union organi-
zations, workers’ participation is lower at company level, a situation which
is even more apparent when compared with the rest of Europe. In general,
it is frequent to find ‘the deficit of democracy in the work place, where the
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rights and union practice of workers are arbitrarily curtailed or repressed by
the employers’ (CGTP, 2004: 118). The low level of labour participation
sometimes goes hand in hand with a culture of subjection that is certainly a
remnant of the dictatorship under which Portugal lived during almost half
the 20th century, and the trade union law, passed in 1975 soon after democ-
racy was restored, has not yet erased this (Costa, 2006). In some cases,
workers’ representation bodies or trade unions organizations are non-
existent at company level. This has been particularly emphasized by trade
union officials in the construction and woodwork sectors, who point to the
absence of trade unions or even comissões de trabalhadores in Sonae
Indústria as a reason for the lack of an EWC. However, a management rep-
resentative, contacted by phone and by email (January 2007), insisted that
this was not the company’s responsibility and should instead be attributed
to the absence of a tradition of trade union and labour organization in
Portugal. The absence of effective employee organization in these MNCs
means they lack a key prerequisite for the establishment of EWCs.
The Portuguese Industrial Relations System and Relationships
between the Main Actors in Employee Representation
Proximity to the Head Office Diminishes the Need for an EWC. Although
it might facilitate the establishment of EWCs, proximity to the head office
seems to constitute a disincentive. It means that employee representatives
already have access to company information, and in the Portuguese case the
right to such information is already enshrined in national law. As one
representative commented:
The issues that an EWC in CIMPOR would approach are not very distant
from the issues that the workers’ commission has been discussing with
central management. In other words, the reason to establish a different
forum of participation lies in the possibility to address different matters.
Here, we hold regular meetings with central management and discuss
issues related to other countries, which means that we already deal with
cross-border information. This may be one of the aspects that results in
our not considering an EWC to be a priority.
Portuguese representatives seem unwilling to lose what Lecher et al.
(1999: 222) call their ‘home advantage’. Proximity to the head office guar-
antees them access to information and gives them a negotiating advantage
with local management, reinforcing the tendency identified by Waddington
(2006b) for home-country representatives to block the establishment of
EWCs on the grounds that these could diminish their privileged influence
within the company.
In contrast, Portuguese representatives participating in EWCs in
foreign MNCs hold a different view. Participation in a cross-national
representative structure is viewed as a source of added value, since the
European Journal of Industrial Relations 14(3)
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exchange of experiences between EWC members reveals the existence of
a wide variety of local working conditions. This makes Portuguese repre-
sentatives perceive EWCs as a means through which working conditions
may be levelled to their advantage. During the interviews with these rep-
resentatives, we noted that they look on EWCs mainly as mechanisms for
transferring their demands from a local to a transnational level, as a means
of access to a higher decision-making platform, and as additional sources
of pressure on local management. Nevertheless, Portuguese representa-
tives equally recognize that representatives from company headquarters
have privileged access to information and that this access represents an
important factor towards imbalance in participation, especially when the
information is not shared in a transparent way among EWC members.
Notably, select committees have been gaining in strategic importance
in EWCs. Waddington (2006a) shows that select committee members and
other office-holders are more satisfied than other EWC members with
the quantity and quality of the information they receive; there is a div-
ision between insiders and outsiders (Waddington, 2006b). This reinforces
the existence of differentiated and asymmetrical participation within
EWCs (Stirling and Tully, 2004), and emphasizes the importance of
power relations in a body which should, in principle, be guided by hori-
zontal equality in its relationships.
Alternation in the Leadership of Worker’s Representative Organizations.
Although it is often seen as an essential democratic principle, the alterna-
tion in the leadership of workers’ representative organizations appears as
a justification for not placing the ‘EWC issue’ high on the agenda.
Portuguese representatives on EWCs acknowledge that this may hinder
their functioning, as the replacement of a Portuguese representative on a
national representation body half-way through their EWC mandate may
break the connection with this transnational institution.
The Lack of Capacity to Take on Duties Beyond Those Already
Performed. This is a further obstacle, since the time they are able to devote
to representative functions is often limited. As one representative com-
mented, ‘people have better things to do! They don’t want to get
involved. And there’s the tendency to let things fall on the same people
over and over again. That’s really a problem.’
Portuguese representatives are generally elected or appointed to EWCs
as members of other structures of representation at national company
level: trade unions and workers’ commissions. In the case of BES Group,
for example, this dual membership proved to be fundamental, not only for
the establishment of the EWC, but also for the dynamic which it later
gained. Nevertheless, what is equally clear from our interviews is that this
dual membership would have more consequences if the representatives
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had the opportunity to devote themselves full-time to the representative
structures. This is not, however, the case for the majority of representatives
whether nominated by trade unions or workers’ commissions. This
reflects a contrast between Portugal and many other countries, such as
France or Germany, whose representatives are seen as more professional.
Conflicts between Workers’ Commissions and Trade Unions. At the
heart of this conflict lies a differentiated view of the role which workers’
commissions and trade unions should play in the establishment and sub-
sequent operation of EWCs. On one side are those who believe that workers’
commissions should be primarily responsible, because they represent the
whole workforce of the company. On the other are those who insist that
unions should predominate; in some sectors we interviewed representatives
who were fighting for a stronger ‘unionization’ of their EWCs. In reality,
the weight of trade union representatives in EWCs is far greater (and a large
number of workers’ commissions are in fact influenced by the ideological
orientations of trade unions) than that of workers’ commissions, although
there are also cases where the union representatives are simultaneously
members of the commissions. At times, the existence of several trade unions
with distinctive sensitivities is also a source of additional conflict.
The Banco Espírito Santo Group EWC
The BES Group has activities in some 20 countries and employs over 5000
staff. However, some 4500 of these are in Portugal and 400 in Spain.4 As
the one Portuguese multinational where an EWC was established, BES
deserves in-depth study. Two interconnected aspects will be highlighted:
first, the initial conditions which permitted the establishment of the EWC;
second, the features that most decisively contribute to its current activity.
Conditions for the Emergence of the BES Group EWC
The possibility of establishing an EWC was first suggested by the work-
ers’ commission after the 2000 workplace elections. It cooperated with
both Portuguese and Spanish trade unions to provide the impetus for the
creation of a Special Negotiating Body (SNB). Negotiations resulted in
the Information and Consultation Procedure (ICP) in July 2003, formal-
ized as an EWC in March 2005, with equal representation for the com-
missions and the unions. From the outset, both UNI-Europa and the
ETUC were informed of the process by the Portuguese trade unions, but
they took no part in the negotiations. The key factors that facilitated the
adoption of the initial agreement are the following.
A good relationship between workers’ representatives and BES Group
central management. In its negotiations with the SNB, management 
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suggested an agreement to establish an ICP, with the option for it to
function in effect as an EWC.
A good relationship between the BES Group workers’ commission and
the Portuguese trade unions. This good relationship stemmed from the
fact that some workers’ commission members were simultaneously trade
union representatives. In this context, the importance of personal rela-
tionships and trust between the various actors proved to be a fundamen-
tal requirement for the establishment and subsequent functioning of the
EWC. As one of the EWC members commented,
I was a member of the workers commission at the same time I was on
the executive of the Sindicato dos Bancários do Centro [Bank Employees
Union of the Central Region of Portugal]. In other words, I held two
positions, distinct but complementary: an internal one at BES Group and
another at an overall level . . . It is only possible to make progress with a
certain kind of undertaking, notably at union level, when people hold
more than one position of responsibility at the same time.
As happens in other institutions, EWCs are dependent on the individ-
ual role played by key actors. As the President of a German-based EWC
points out, learning to operate an EWC is also learning the art of diplo-
macy (Namuth, 2005).
A good relationship between the BES Group workers’ commission and
Spanish trade unions. The EWC benefits from the geographical proxim-
ity of Portugal and Spain, the only foreign BES Group operation with a
significant number of employees. The cooperative relationship was cru-
cial for the constitution of the EWC, with ten Portuguese representatives
and one from Spain.
Thanks to our good relationship with the Spanish unions – the Spanish UGT
and the Comisiones Obreras – we managed to take advantage of a meeting
held in September 2001 . . . to trigger the negotiations. The three Portuguese
unions and the representatives of these two major Spanish unions then
signed a petition for the beginning of negotiations. Negotiations took place,
the SNB was set up … and we signed the [ICP] agreement on 16 July 2003.
Subsequently, when BES acquired the Spanish bank Inversión and
shifted its strategy in Spain, this partnership proved indispensable to its
increasing importance and dynamic, including the conversion of the ICP
into an EWC. The bilateral relation between Portugal and Spain tends,
however, to make the EWC more Iberian than European.
The Dynamism of the EWC
A number of factors make the EWC an effective and dynamic body.
Its activities extend beyond the ‘rigid boundaries’ of the agreement. This
is one of the most marked features of the functioning of the EWC. The
terms of the formal agreement match the minimum requirements stipulated
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by the Directive. However, the EWC is not in practice restricted by these
terms, and has been able to hold frequent meetings with central manage-
ment and to meet employees in the Group’s operations abroad who are not
represented. This is in line with the finding of other researchers that the let-
ter of the agreements and the actual practice of EWCs do not necessarily
coincide (Telljohann, 2005; Waddington, 2003).
As noted above, when the EWC was still simply designated an ICP, the
BES Group began the acquisition of the bank Inversión. Management
envisaged job reductions in Spain and the integration of both Portuguese
and Spanish workers under new contractual conditions. The EWC
came to play a successful mediation role between central management
and the Spanish trade unions, which negotiated with central management
exclusively through the EWC. According to the Portuguese EWC repre-
sentative, the dialogue and conciliation of interests were only possible
because of the mediation of a supranational and more flexible structure
such as the EWC.
The acquisition of information and development of a holistic outlook on
the Group’s activities. The experience of the BES Group EWC is further
evidence that access to information tends to shift bargaining demands
and outcomes in qualitatively new ways, which suggests that EWCs
might indeed exert an important impact on the balance of internal power
relations and on employee empowerment (Müller and Hoffmann, 2001;
Weston and Martínez Lucio, 1997).
Proactive rather than merely reactive. The EWC’s proactivity involves,
for example, shaping the agenda of the meetings between workers’ repre-
sentatives and central management. In this regard, in-depth knowledge of
the Group’s activities and strategies is crucial. It is at this precise point that
the cognitive dimension of the EWC – the ability to improve its knowledge
of the Group’s structure and activities – and their practical capacities – the
possibility actually to achieve something – will converge (Didry et al., 2005).
Furthermore, it has been acknowledged that the strengthening of
EWCs should involve continuous action both in times of crisis (restruc-
turing, mergers, take-overs) and in times of stability (Béthoux, 2004). In
the first case, the EWC should mobilize and articulate the responses
of the different actors within the various national arenas. In the second,
their actions should anticipate company strategies. According to Moreau
(2006), EWCs possess a natural vocation to intervene, for example, in sit-
uations where undertakings are subject to restructuring. As the sole com-
pany-level body for transnational representation, their composition and
organization enable them to combine and coordinate the practices and
actions of the various representatives of European workers. EWCs are
thus part of a ‘Europeanization’ of labour relations, which reflects the
emergence of new synergies between social and economic actors.
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Maximizing networks and informal contacts which, combined with
‘trips to the source’, that is, to the company’s national and international
branch offices, facilitates access to ‘credible information’ upon which the
EWC may base its action. This is a crucial issue since information and
consultation, the two pillars on which the Directive is founded, are still
widely debated in the literature on EWCs. This is a result since many
EWC researchers question whether the Directive has in fact improved
the extent, quality and timeliness of information and consultation for
employee representatives.
The accumulated experience of EWC members both in terms of its
functioning and the accumulation of social capital. The first enables
workers’ representatives to maximize their potentialities for influence,
while the second favours the development of networks among the vari-
ous representatives.
The mediation role fulfilled by the EWC between central management,
Portuguese and foreign worker representation bodies or trade union
organizations and workers, notably over matters likely to affect workers’
interests considerably, such as mergers and take-overs. As noted above,
the role of the EWC during the Inversión acquisition enhanced its legit-
imacy. The interviews conducted with Portuguese representatives from
MNCs based in foreign countries demonstrate that the ability of an
EWC to deal successfully with a potential crisis is crucial to turn it into
a success story (Hyman, 2000). This was clearly what occurred in the
Inversión, as a member of the EWC explained:
In 2004, the EWC faced its first challenge, a major operation in Spain.
Because the EWC is a supranational structure we were requested by the
Spanish trade unions to collect the necessary information and to follow up
the operation. This would not be possible at any other negotiating table.
No other structure has the capacity to have all these worker representation
bodies and trade unions represented simultaneously . . . We met leaders
from all trade unions represented at BES . . . Why? Because they all 
understood that the setting up of this EWC had come at the right time to
defend, on the one hand, the existing staff at BES and, on the other, the
new workforce from Inversión. BES Group central management also
understood that this was a structure that would create obstacles if certain
situations were to arise, that we would be paying close attention to the
unfolding of the operation. What is important here? To preserve the rights
of those who are here and to safeguard the rights of workers coming from
the other company. Because we know that in cases of mergers or 
take-overs in the banking sector there is a great number of workers whose
jobs have an expiry date.
The positive feedback between EWC members and workers. The EWC’s
visibility results, to a great extent, from the information disseminated by
a Newsletter specially designed for that purpose.
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Final Remarks
As explained in the analysis presented earlier, the case of the BES Group
EWC constitutes an ‘isolated island’ at present. In fact, EWCs continue
to be viewed with scepticism by the representatives of workers’ organ-
izations in most Portuguese companies and are not a practical priority for
the time being. EWCs are viewed as incapable of remedying the prob-
lems currently affecting workers within the framework of economic
globalization (restructuring processes and unemployment being the most
commonly cited here). Furthermore, the information potentially
acquired through the participation in EWCs is not regarded as an added
value, and the decision-making process is perceived as a prerogative of
central managements that will remain so independently of the greater or
lesser capability of any given EWC to intervene.
Nevertheless, the representatives of Portuguese MNCs do recognize, at
least theoretically, some positive aspects to EWCs: the achievement of
more in-depth knowledge about the company; the contact with and under-
standing of employment conditions in different countries; the exchange
of experiences with different worker representation bodies and trade
union organizations that are confronted with similar problems; the cre-
ation of conditions to attenuate the effects of restructuring; the develop-
ment of transnational dialogue and transnational action; and the creation of
international solidarity.
In addition to being one of the oldest aspirations of the labour move-
ment, this challenge of international labour solidarity is perhaps the
greatest one, as it combines with several other challenges. However, the
results underlying international solidarity are not always what might be
expected. For example, the only GM-Europe factory in Portugual (at
Azambuja) was closed in December 2006. This was regarded by workers’
commission members and trade union representatives in Portuguese
MNCs – and also by several Portuguese members of EWCs in foreign
multinationals – as a sign that EWCs lacked real power. And this was
despite the wave of protests which paralysed several GM plants in June
2006 (the ‘Euro-Strike’, as it came to be known), one of the few examples
of cross-national strike action; and despite the transnational agreements
on restructuring negotiated between the EWC and GM becoming a point
of reference in other European MNCs (Da Costa and Rehfeldt, 2007).
Nevertheless, for the Portuguese representatives on the GM EWC
(whom we interviewed a month before the closure of the plant), the role
of the EWC deserved praise, as it prompted solidarity actions which
transcended the competing interests of the transnational labour force in
the GM Group.
In general, we might say that the representatives of Portuguese MNCs
appear divided between the urgency of national issues and the inadequacy
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of their representation mechanisms, when faced with a change in the
scale of multinational operations. Despite being relatively recent, the 
experience of the EWC from BES Group may serve as a reference not
only for the financial sector but for other sectors as well. Both the
evolution of this EWC and the experience of Portuguese representatives
in other EWCs has enabled us to draw a conclusion about the Portuguese
case: there is an urgent need to set up a network of Portuguese represen-
tatives at EWCs both within and between the various sectors, for the
purpose of exchanging experience, discussing possible joint strategies and
maximizing the positive effects provided by EWCs.
Moreover, it remains urgent for information about EWCs to be dis-
seminated among the workers’ representatives in Portuguese MNCs.
Learning from ‘good practice’ (and it should be noted, for example, that
the GM EWC was seen by its Portuguese representatives as an example
of good practice, even though it failed to prevent the closure of their
plant), instead of fruitlessly bemoaning the unsuccessful cases, is prob-
ably the best way to convert the pessimism of Portuguese workforce rep-
resentatives towards EWCs into a more optimistic attitude.
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NOTES
1 The research was undertaken between June 2005 and September 2007. It was
conducted as part of the project Os Conselhos de Empresa Europeus: entre a
responsabilidade social da empresa e a participação laboral (European Works
Councils: between corporate social responsibility and labour participation’
(POCI/SOC/59689/2004), funded by the Fundação para a Ciência
e Tecnologia (Portuguese Foundation for Science and Technology).
2 There are actually 343 EWCs, since a few MNCs have created separate 
bodies for subsidiary operations. There are 482 actual agreements, since
some companies have negotiated more than one.
3 The European Works Councils Database lists nine MNCs based in Portugal
and covered by the Directive. However, two are included in error, Pão-de-
Açucar and Companhia Ibérica de Distribuição (both in the retail distribution
sector). Since 1996, both these undertakings have been subsidiaries of the
French Group Auchan.
4 It is notable that Spain appears to be the only country in which all
Portuguese multinationals have undertakings: the integration of Portugal
into the EU has primarily involved economic relations with its larger 
neighbour, that is, an Iberianization of its economy. Reis and Baganha
(2001: 21) state that ‘at a time when the emblematic term is globalization,
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the economic space of [Portugal’s] foreign relations is increasingly more
European than global and increasingly more Iberian than European’.
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